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A Function-Oriented Model of Initial Language Planning in Sub-Saharan Africa*

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1. Introduction

Language planning means slightly different things to different writers as clearly shown by Karam (1974). However, most people would agree with Fishman (1974) that the generally accepted components of language planning are: policy formulation, codification, elaboration, implementation and evaluation.

In this paper, language planning is considered in the matrix of overall national[1] (governmental) planning. The language planning processes mentioned above are, for the purposes of this paper, summarized under two headings--policy formulation and language engineering. Policy formulation is concerned with the initial stage of language planning, and is characterized by Fishman et al. (1971) as "the functional allocation of codes within a speech community." The term "language engineering" is used in this paper to cover those aspects of language planning that entail deliberate and planned attempts to change language structure and behavior. The processes covered by language engineering are: codification, elaboration, and implementation. Evaluation, as Rubin (1971) has shown, interpenetrates all the processes, and is necessary at every stage of language planning.

The approach adopted in this paper is functional in two senses. In the first place, language planning is viewed as decision making involving the determination and assignment of desired functions to the various language varieties within a given country, and the planned measures to get these decisions accepted by the target population. Secondly, the intrinsic functions of language (those functions possessed to some degree by every natural human language) serve as the basis for policy-making and language engineering decisions.

2. Language planning and Sub-Saharan Africa

It was noted in the preceding section that the two major processes involved in language planning are policy formulation and language engineering. Language engineering is particularly relevant in situations where policy decisions have already been taken. In Africa, however, only a handful of countries have taken basic language decisions, such as the choice of a national language. Appendices A and B show that for the vast majority of African countries, language planning will have to be at the level of policy formulation. Even in countries where some policy decisions have

been taken, there is still no clear allocation of domains of usage to the national language[2] vis-à-vis the other indigenous languages, and the exoglossic or official language. In two countries--Central African Republic and Togo--the national language is nominally symbolic, and has not been assigned any significant function. Even in Tanzania, the African country with the most vigorous implementation policy, there is still no consensus as to the desired functions to be performed by Swahili. Clearly then, the aspect of language planning most relevant to Sub-Saharan Africa is policy formulation. Appendix A shows that, apart from the almost homogeneous nation-states of Lesotho, Botswana, Burundi, Rwanda and Somalia, all African countries are linguistically heterogeneous, with an average of fifteen or more language varieties. Policy formulation in these countries will not be an easy task, so the rest of this paper is devoted to this important problem.

3. Policy formulation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A functional approach

It is postulated in this paper that the intrinsic functions of language can serve as a basis for language policy decisions. Most linguists would agree that a language performs at least two functions--the expressive and the communicative--for those people for whom it is their native variety. There is also general agreement that language is frequently a symbol of solidarity and thus serves, in many instances, a unifying[3] function. By the same token, language often arouses "primordial"[4] sentiments and loyalties; it is frequently an outward symbol of ethnic cleavages and, in this sense, serves a separatist function.

The four functions mentioned above are given from the point of view of the native speaker of a language. However, language planning usually entails a change in the linguistic behavior of the target community, sometimes requiring the acquisition by some people of new speech varieties in addition to, or in place of their native speech patterns. Old speech habits are hard to change, and studies have shown that most people learn new languages only if these are perceived as useful in personal advancement, or as necessary for participation in a culturally or economically richer life. In short, for a language to be readily learned, it must serve for the learner a participatory function.

In the theory proposed in this paper, adequate policy formulation must take into account all the five functions mentioned above. In many situations, it would be impossible to find a single language variety that could fulfill all the functions. In such instances, a bilingual or multilingual policy of language use would be in order. The implications of this functional approach for policy formulation in Sub-Saharan Africa are discussed below.

3.1. Expressive function. Anthropological linguists point out that language is an embodiment of a people's culture and is expressive of their experiences and world view. In the African context, an exoglossic[5] language cannot, unmodified, capture those experiences that are peculiarly African. The expressive function, so defined, is very often the basis for advocators of "authenticity"

in policy formulation. As reported by Whiteley (1974), protagonists for the adoption of Akan in Ghana, during debates over the national issue, brought to the fore this inability of an exoglossic language to serve the expressive function for Africans.

In the frame of reference used here, one possible way of satisfying the expressive function is to extend the domains of usage of one of the indigenous languages, so that it eventually replaces, and serves the functions of, all the other native varieties within the target community. Tanzania, with its "hard sell" program of Swahili, seems to have adopted this approach.

Another possible solution is to give some form of recognition to all the indigenous language varieties in a given community; the vernaculars could, for instance, be used as mediums of instruction at the lower levels of education. Political and economic factors may, however, militate against this approach. Even if it is deemed politically and educationally expedient to recognize all the indigenous languages, economic factors may force a contrary decision. How economically feasible would it be, for instance, for a country like the Central African Republic, with a population of about 1 1/2 million, to embark on training teachers and producing educational materials for the thirty-five language varieties in the country? It is significant to note that it is in countries like Nigeria, Zaire, and Kenya, which have numerically important languages, that a measure of recognition has been given to the indigenous languages. Economic, demographic, and political factors can thus limit the role of the expressive function in policy formulation.

3.2. The communicative function. Although all human languages serve the communicative function, they differ from one another in communicative adequacy as judged by their level of modernization. Only well "developed" languages in the Fergusonian sense can thus adequately fulfill the communicative function. Since no African language is fully modernized in the sense described above (Amharic and Swahili are in the process of modernizing), the exoglossic language would be favored if the communicative function is given predominance. This may account for the retention by independent African countries of exoglossic languages (usually French or English) for official or co-official functions. In Ethiopia, the fact that Tigrinya is relatively "modern" may account for its partial recognition, whereas the numerically superior but unstandardized Gallinya has absolutely no official recognition.

Taking the communicative function into account in policy formulation does not necessarily mean giving recognition to an already modernized language. If other factors are favorable, an indigenous language could be chosen, as in Kenya and Tanzania, with a view to eventually modernizing it. Such modernization usually involves lexical and stylistic elaboration and, sometimes, requires an enormous outlay in money, time, equipment and personnel. The immediate economic and practical obstacles presented by any such wholesale modernization program cannot be underestimated. This may account, in part, for the preference by the majority of

African countries for the retention of exoglossic languages for official and wider-communication purposes. However, the ultimate question for policy formulators is whether language policies should be based on immediate utility and convenience, or whether deeper-based cultural issues should be taken into consideration.

3.3. The unifying function. It has sometimes been assumed that European languages can serve as catalysts for unity in African countries. This can only be so if unity is limited to the superficial level of practical communication. Beyond this level, language cannot, of itself, unite people of disparate and varying backgrounds. How, for instance, does the possession of a common language unite a Gabonese and, say, a French Canadian?

It must be pointed out that the fact that an exoglossic language cannot serve the unifying function in Africa does not necessarily mean that any endoglóssic language can perform this function. Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) have convincingly argued that ethnicity is the most compelling basis for group cohesion. Where language coincides with ethnicity, as in the nation-states of Europe such as Germany, Portugal, Denmark, Greece, and Iceland, language can certainly fulfill a unifying function. In Africa, language can serve a unifying function in the ethnically and linguistically homogeneous nations of Lesotho and Somali, and possibly in Botswana.

On the other hand, language cannot serve a unifying function in countries where ethnicity and language do not coincide. However, the possession of the same language by members of different ethnic groups within a community neutralizes the potential use of language for divisive purposes by unscrupulous political entrepreneurs. Thus, even though the common use of English by the English, Irish, Scots, and Welsh has not completely removed the animosities between the four groups, language is no longer a salient political issue. Similarly, in Africa, the fact that the Hutus and the Tutsis share a common language--Rundi in Burundi, and Rwanda in Rwanda--has not eliminated their animosities, but at least language cannot be used as an additional divisive force.

The remaining countries of Africa are, as indicated in Appendix A, linguistically as well as ethnically heterogeneous. Language cannot, as already noted, perform a unifying function in these countries, so unity must be sought at other levels. Language planning is, however, still relevant here with respect to the unifying function. Although language is at present politically unimportant in Africa, its potential divisive saliency cannot be ignored by policy formulators. The experience of Belgium, where language formerly posed no problem, shows that language can gradually gain political saliency with increasing ethnic assertion and corresponding literacy in the ethnic language. Policy formulators would, therefore, have to take steps to neutralize the potential divisive saliency of the various indigenous languages. Two courses are possible--the assimilative approach, and the *laissez-faire* approach. France and England, where minority language varieties were assimilated into French and English respectively,

are good examples of the assimilative approach. It must be pointed out that the assimilative approach works best in totalitarian regimes, such as absolute monarchies. However, the success of Tanzania's Swahili implementation program suggests that it may also work well in relatively democratic societies.

Switzerland is the example, par excellence, of the *laissez-faire* approach. In this approach, the primordial or natural loyalties represented by language and ethnicity are not disturbed. They are rather accepted and taken into consideration in political organization, leading, in many instances, to the creation of linguistically-defined political units.

Both approaches present problems in the African context. The integrative approach would have to deal with the problem of choosing an acceptable national language, and the *laissez-faire* approach would have to reconcile the requirement for linguistically-based political units with the viability of mini-units based on language varieties with a small number of native speakers, as in the Sudan, Gabon, and Zambia. These problems are tackled in a subsequent section.

3.4. Separatist function. Although it was noted above that language is often the outward symbol of ethnic cleavages, it must be pointed out that there are several instances where language does not serve a separatist function. The Scotsman who shares English with other ethnic groups in Great Britain, cannot use language as a symbol of ethnic uniqueness,[6] but must rely on other things such as dress, dance, etc., to perform this function. The situation is different in other European countries. Emphasis on the separatist function led, for instance, to the emergence of two standard languages--German and Dutch--from mutually intelligible dialects. In the same way, the emergence of standard Flemish can be regarded as symbolizing Flemish assertion of independence and separation from the neighboring Dutch.

Turning to Africa, only languages that do not extend beyond one country can fulfill the separatist function at the national level. Here, it must be pointed out that the separatist function is in conflict with the participatory function, and that policy formulators must balance separatist and participatory tendencies.

In linguistically homogeneous countries, such as Botswana, Burundi, Lesotho, Rwanda, and Somali, where the principal language varieties are mainly confined to one nation, language can serve a separatist function. Amharic can also potentially play this role in Ethiopia if and when Amharic becomes accepted throughout the country.

For the heterogeneous African countries, language serves a separatist function only at the ethnic level. Emphasis on the separatist function of language at the national level automatically implies the adoption of the assimilative approach to language policy. Such a policy emphatically rules out the adoption of an exoglossic language, but it also rules out some indigenous African languages of wider communication, such as Swahili and Hausa, which are not limited to the confines of any one country.

The arbitrary nature of national boundaries in Africa has often been pointed out. Some people, notably Sekou Toure of Guinea, and the late Nkrumah of Ghana, have argued that nationalism is not feasible in the African context, and that the only way to counter Africa's artibrary colonial boundaries is to opt for pan-Africanism. In this way, it is argued, Africa can once more regain her "natural" boundaries. There are obviously many points for and against this view, and policy formulators would have to carefully balance the pros and the cons. They would have to decide whether nationalism as known in Europe is appropriate for Africa, or whether separation, if at all, should be sought at the continental or pan-African level. Their decision will be reflected in their choice of a national language. A vote for nationalism would be reflected in the choice of a nationally unique language. On the other hand, if pan-Africanism is preferred, a potentially pan-African language is favored. East African countries, notably Kenya and Tanzania, seem to have gone the pan-African route in their choice of Swahili as the national language, but an analogous development does not seem possible in West Africa, due to the different political and sociological forces at work in that area.

3.5. The participatory function. In contrast to the separatist function which is inward-looking, the participatory function is outward-looking. As Garvin (1973) points out, it works in favor of modernized or "intellectualized"[7] languages. Modernization, however, is not enough. English and French are regularly used in scientific reports by scholars in Poland, Holland, Czechoslovakia, etc.--countries that already possess highly standardized languages of their own.

The importance of the participatory function cannot therefore be overemphasized. In homogeneous but sparsely populated countries such as Iceland, Finland, and Greece, the need for languages of wider communication has led to the general adoption of English, French, and, sometimes, German as second languages. In Africa, a country such as Ethiopia which was never colonized by a foreign power, has still found it necessary to use English for semi-official purposes. The de facto exoglossic language policies of most African countries may also be due, in part, to the high degree to which French and English possess the participatory function.

The participatory function requires of policy formulators that they order national priorities with respect to the people with whom association is desired.[8] When Turkey opted for participation in the European community rather than the Moslem world, it changed its language policy accordingly. In contrast to this, the desire by some African countries--notably Mauritania, Sudan, and Somalia--to associate with the Moslem world, has led to their preference of Arabic over French, English, and Italian.

In summary, the expressive, unifying and separatist functions require the recognition of endoglossic languages in policy formulation, while the communicative and participatory functions dictate the retention (for some time at least) of exoglossic

languages. A policy of "exendoglossism"--partial exoglossism and partial endoglossism--is therefore indicated for Sub-Saharan Africa. As for the domains of usage, the experience of Europe shows that other things being favorable (e.g. economic and demographic viability), any chosen national language could be used for legislative and administrative purposes, and as a medium of instruction up to and including the university. Due to the rather universal nature of science and technology, the exoglossic language could be used in the sciences, and the national language could be reserved for the humanities at the university level. The exoglossic language could also be used for international trade and foreign relations. As for the indigenous varieties not chosen as the national language, they could be used for transitional purposes at lower primary school levels of instruction. Whether the numerically more important languages are granted regional official status, and allowed to be developed for use up to the university level as in India, depends on whether the assimilative or *laissez-faire* approach is adopted.

The exact form this basic model of "exendoglossism" takes would differ from country to country, depending on sociological, historical, demographic, and other variables.

4. Variations on proposed model: Some significant variables in policy formulation

The effect of religious variables on language choice in Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan has already been pointed out. The influence of demographic variables (numerical strength, presence or absence of homogeneity, etc.) on policy formulation has also been pointed out. Some other important variables are discussed in this section under three headings--societal structure, attitudes, and pressure to change.

4.1. Societal structure. The effect of the demographic dimension of societal structure has been mentioned. In relatively linguistically homogeneous countries like Botswana, Burundi, Lesotho, Rwanda, and Somalia, it may be possible to grant recognition to only one indigenous language. However, in Nigeria, Zaire, Uganda, Kenya, and Ghana--countries in which there are a number of numerically significant languages, each with 1 million speakers or more--it may be necessary to have regional official languages in addition to the national and exoglossic languages.

At the political level, it should be pointed out that the approach to language planning outlined here is based on the assumption that there is some form of democracy or at least some free choice in the target communities. It does not apply in totalitarian regimes where policy formulators do not have to worry about the popularity of their decisions, but even here an understanding of the functions of language as they apply in language engineering, could lead to easier implementation.

Also, language policies can differ depending on whether the political structure is characterized by minority domination, majority domination, or a competitive configuration.[9] If the

political structure is such that active rivalries and antagonisms exist, as was the case in Nigeria, Zaire, and Sierra Leone before the military take-overs, an acceptable language policy is more dififcult to arrive at. On the other hand, when there is a clear dominant group, policy decisions may be easier to make.

The fact that power in Liberia is firmly entrenched in the hands of a minority English-speaking elite, may account for what Whiteley (1974) sees as Liberia's "unequivocal" opting for English. However, dominance does not necessarily ensure policy acceptance. The inability of the numerically and politically dominant Sinhalese to impose their language on the rest of the population in Ceylon, shows that dominance is not enough. The Ceylonese experience is paralleled in Africa by Sudan and Mauritania, where an attempt by the Arab rulers to impose Arabic on the rest of the population is meeting with resistance from minority language groups.

In this approach, as already pointed out, the presence of democratic processes is assumed. Dominance does not ensure acceptance for a poorly formulated policy. Such a policy can only succeed in a completely totalitarian regime, or in a situation where the dominated or minority groups are not politically mobilized.

4.2. Attitudes. Prestige factors are important in policy formulation. A prestigious language variety is more likely to be generally accepted than its non-prestigious counterpart. The fact that Pidgin English lacks prestige and, in fact, evokes negative attitudes in many West Africans, may account for the vehemence with which the idea of giving it some recognition has been rejected in Cameroun, Nigeria, Ghana, and Sierra Leone--countries in which the Pidgin plays the role of a lingua franca. On the other hand, Swahili's privileged position in East Africa, dating from the time of Arab imperialism, may account for its ready acceptance in two East African countries.

One possible measure of prestige is the degree of popularity of any given language variety, as judged by the number of non-native speakers that opt to learn it. In this sense, Luganda in Uganda, Gallinya in Ethiopia, and Kongo in Congo-Brazzaville, are not particularly popular languages since their use is limited mostly to speakers for whom they are native varieties. Their elevation to national status in their respective countries will probably not meet with as much opposition as will the languages mentioned above.

The attitudes of the various ethnic groups in a community towards one another would also influence policy formulation. If active mutual animosities exist among several groups in any given country, a *laissez-faire* approach to policy formulation would be in order--other factors permitting.

Policy formulators, to be effective, must be cognizant of the prevailing attitudes in their target population. Conducting attitude surveys[10] is one way of determining the attitudinal climate of any given community.

4.3. Pressure to change. Language planning, it has already been noted, usually entails a change in the linguistic behavior of the target population. A language policy that exerts more pressure to change on one or more groups than on others, is likely to lead to problems. Simon (1969) states, for instance, that the language friction in Canada is caused, in part, by French Canadian resentment for being exposed to greater pressure to learn English than there is for the English Canadian to learn French. The theoretical implication of this is that the most desirable policy is one that exerts equal pressure to change on all the component groups in a given country.

In practice, such a policy is impossible; the best that can be done would be to formulate the policy in such a way that it exerts equal pressure on the vast majority of the target population. In terms of the choice of a national language, this could be achieved by adopting either the majority approach or the minority approach. In the majority approach, a numerically preponderant language is elevated to national status, as in Lesotho and Burundi. In the minority approach, the language elevated to national status is numerically a minority, as judged by the number of speakers for whom it is their native variety.

In view of the Indian, Ceylonese, and Sudanese experiences, it must be pointed out that the majority approach works best when the language chosen is clearly preponderant numerically (90% or more) as in the homogeneous African countries mentioned in this paper; another important prerequisite is that the numerically minority language(s) not be prestigious.

In Africa, the minority approach is represented by the language policies of Tanzania and Kenya where Swahili, the national language, is native to less than 5% of the population. The elevation of minority languages to national status has also been successfully done in Southeast Asia, as in the case of Bahasa Indonesia, and Tagalog in the Philippines. It must, of course, be pointed out that the three languages mentioned above--Swahili, Bahasa Indonesia, and Tagalog--had one advantage over their rivals. They were more standardized, and were, indeed, already used as lingua francas in their respective countries.

Another contributing factor to the success of the minority approach is that it exerts equal pressure to learn on the majority of the population, while giving advantage (if any) to a numerically insignificant group. Since the majority approach cannot work in the majority of African countries because of their heterogeneity, one possible alternative is the minority approach. However, apart from Senegal and the Central African Republic, where Wolof and Sango, respectively, are fast becoming prestige languages, the rest of the heterogeneous countries are handicapped by having neither an indigenous prestige language nor a national lingua franca.

It is not clear if a non-prestigious minority indigenous language could be successfully elevated to national status. This has not been tried elsewhere, but it seems to be a course worthy of investigation. Attitudes towards the chosen language could be changed through vigorous promotion campaigns;[11] the participatory

function could be cultivated for the language by making it a requirement in education, and for entry into certain professions. Moreover, the collaboration of the various ethnic groups within a given country in the codification and elaboration of an unstandardized or inadequately standardized language may, of itself, foster a feeling of unity.

5. Conclusion

The vast majority of African countries have not taken policy decisions regarding the status and desired functions of the various language varieties existing within their boundaries. As a result, this paper has concentrated on initial language planning, as represented in policy formulation. Based on the requirements of a functional theory of language planning, a policy of "exendoglossism" is envisaged for Sub-Saharan Africa. The exact form this basic model would take in any given country would depend on many factors, such as societal structure, attitudes, and the degree of integration desired.

Finally, language planning has been envisaged at the national level, in recognition of the self-perpetuating nature of existing boundaries, no matter how arbitrary. The suppression by African countries of all attempts at secession, and the failure of the East African, Senegambia and Mali federations, all point to this. All the same, the approach adopted here would still be useful if conditions ever become favorable for political and language planning at the pan-African level. The rise of national languages would, it is believed, facilitate the choice of pan-African languages by, at least, limiting the number of candidate languages.

Footnotes

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[1]"National" as used in this paper does not refer to ethnic nationalities as used in connection with Europe. "Nation" is here used in the same sense as in the United Nations Charter to refer to independent, self-governing countries, some of which are composed of several states and/or nationalities.

[2]In many European countries the "national" and "official" language coincide, but in Africa it is necessary to draw a distinction between the two. A language is official if it is used for legislative and administrative purposes, i.e., if it is recognized in some way by a central or regional government. A national language, while it may also be used for legislative and administrative purposes, symbolizes the unity and identity of the nation, and is by definition an indigenous language. See Garvin (1973) for more discussion.

[3]The "unifying", "separatist", and "participatory" functions are adapted from Garvin (1973).

[4]The term "primordial" is used after Geertz (1963).

[5]See Kloss (1968) for an explanation of the terms "exoglossic" and "endoglossic".

[6]It is here assumed that the language variety spoken in Scotland is a dialect of English. However, it could quite possibly be considered to be a separate language, in which case it could serve the separatist function. It should also be noted that even a dialect could serve this function if separatist tendencies are strong enough.

[7]The term "intellectualization" is roughly the Prague School equivalent of "modernization". See Garvin (1959) for further details.

[8]It should be noted that there are two dimensions of participation--world-wide and national. One of the aims of language engineering is the cultivation of the participatory function (through modernization and promotion) for any chosen endoglossic national language.

[9]See Rabushka and Shepsle (1972) for further discussion on political structures.

[10]For an example of an attitude survey see the paper by Wolfgang Wölck in Shuy and Fasold (1973).

[11]Although television and other modern communication media are not yet common in Africa, vigorous promotion is still possible, especially at the village level through, say, youth mobilization and adult education programs.

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Appendix A: Degree of Multilingualism

Country	Population	Language of Largest Group[1]	Language Primacy (if diff)[3]	Other Large Groups (Languages)	No. of Langs.[2]
Botswana	700,000	Tswana-90%		Shona	2
Burundi	3.5 million	Tundi-99%		Twa	2
Cameroun	6 million	Beti-Pahouin-18%		Bamileke,	50+
C.A. Rep.	1.6 million	Banda-31%	Sango?	Baya, Mandjia	35+
Chad	4 million	Arabic-46%		Sara, Maba, Kirdi	±20
Congo Brazz.	1 million	Kongo-52%		Teke, Lingala, Monokutuba	±10
Dahomey	2.7 million	Fon-Ewe-60%		Bariba, Yoruba	±15
Ethiopia	25.5 million	Gallinya-50%	Amharic	Ahmaric, Somali Afar, Tjgrinya	50+
Gabon	1/2 million	Fang-30%		Eshira, Banjabi	±15
Gambia	360,000	Mandingo		Creole, Wolof	3
Chana	8.5 million	Akan-44%		Dagomba, Ewe, Ga	30+
Guinea	4 million	Malinke-48%		Fulani, Kpelle	±20
Ivory Coast	4.5 million	Akan-25%		Kru, Mande	50+
Kenya	11 million	Kikuyu-20%	Swahili	Luhya, Luo	20+
Lesotho	1 million	Sotho-95%		Zulu, Xhosa	3
Liberia	1.2 million	Mande-44%		Kru, Bassa	25+
Malawi	4.5 million	Nyanga-46%		Lomwe, Yao	±10
Mali	5 million	Bambara-31%		Fulani, Senufo	±15
Mauritania	1.2 million	Arabic-80%		Fulani	±5
Niger	4 million	Hausa-46%		Songhai, Fulani	10+
Nigeria	60 million	Hausa-29%		Igbo, Yoruba	100+
Rwanda	3.5 million	Rwanda-90%		Swahili	2
Senegal	4 million	Wolof-37%		Fulani	±10
Sierra Leone	2.5 million	Mende-31%		Temne, Vai	±10
Somalia	3 million	Somali-95%		Swahili	3
Sudan	16 million	Arabic-51%		Nuba, Darfur	100+
Tanzania	13.3 million	Sukuma-12%	Swahili	Ha	50+
Togo	2 million	Ewe-44%		Kabre	±15
Uganda	10 million	Ganda-20%	Swahili?	Soga, Nkole, Lango	±25
Upper Volta	5.3 million	Mossi-50%		Dyula, Senufu	20+
Zaire	22 million	Kongo-30%		Swahili, Lingala	50+
Zambia	4.3 million	Bemba-15%		Luapula, Lamba	±60

Notes:

[1] % after a language indicates % of total population for whom it's their native variety.

[2] In the absence of reliable language surveys, the number of languages are merely approximate as indicated by the use of + and ± signs. The data are enough, however, to distinguish between heterogeneous and relatively homogeneous countries.

[3] Language primacy is given for countries where there are indigenous lingua francas with more speakers than the language of the largest ethnic group.

Appendix A (continued)

Sources:

Morrison, D. G., et al. 1972. *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook.* New York: The Free Press.

Knappers, J. 1965. Language problems of the New Nations of Africa. *Africa Quarterly* 5:95-105.

Appendix B: Language Policies

Country	Exoglossic Language	Any Natl. Lg.?[1] Usage %	% Pop. for whom Natl. Lg. Native[2]	Lingua Franca (if any)[3]
Botswana	English	Setswana (M) 99%	90%	Setswana
Burundi	French	Rundi (M) 99%	99%	Rundi
Cameroun	French-English	-	-	Beti-Pahoun(r)
C. A. Rep.	French	Sango (S) 25%	5%	Sango
Chad	French	-	-	Arabic-46%, Sara 28%
Congo Brazz.	French	-	-	Lingala (r)
Dahomey	French	-	-	Fon-Ewe
Ethiopia	English	Amharic (V) 70%	20%	Amharic
Gabon	French	-	-	Fang
Ghana	English	-	-	?
Guinea	French	-	-	-
Ivory Coast	French	-	-	-
Kenya	English	Swahili (M) 65%	5%	Swahili
Lesotho	English	Sotho (M) 98%	95%	Sotho
Liberia	English	English??	4%	English
Malawi	English	-	-	Nyanga-60% Pop.
Mali	French	-	-	Bambera, Arabic
Mauritania	French	Arabic (V) 87%	80%	Arabic
Niger	French	-	-	Hausa
Nigeria	English	-	-	Hausa (4)
Rwanda	French	Rwanda (M) 98%	90%	Rwanda, Swahili
Senegal	French	-	-	Wolof-60% Pop.
Sierra Leone	English	-	-	Krio, Mende
Somalia	English/Italian	-	-	Somali-97% Pop.
Sudan	English	Arabic (M) 60%	50%	Arabic, Pidgin English
Tanzania	English	Swahili (V) 80%	5%	Swahili
Togo	French	Ewe (S) 50%	44%	Ewe, Hausa
Uganda	English	-	-	Ganda, Swahili
Upper Volta	French	-	-	Mossi
Zaire	French	-	-	Lingala, Swahili
Zambia	English	-	-	English?

Notes:

[1](V) and (M) after the names of national languages indicate vigorous or moderate implementation policies. (S) indicates that the languages are symbolic and are not assigned any significant function in government. (r) after the name of a lingua franca means that the language has limited regional usage within the whole country.

[2]% in this column (Col. IV) represents % of population for whom the national language is their native variety.

[3]Percentages are given for lingua francas that are not national languages but are used by a sizeable percentage of the population, i.e., lingua francas that have a good chance of becoming national languages.

Source:

Morrison, D. G., et al. 1972. *Black Africa: A Comparative Handbook.* New York: The Free Press.